Padraig Colman

Rambling ruminations of an Irishman in Sri Lanka

Tag: Rwanda

Hate Speech and Free Speech

This article appeared on page 7 of Ceylon Today on Tuesday April 28 2015.

 Colman's Column3

I’m of the opinion that we fought too hard for freedom of speech to have a wrong ‘un like this define the terms of it – one day you’re censoring people who offend you, the next you are being censored by people you offend – it’s a slippery slope. Julie Burchill on calls to ‘silence’ Katie Hopkins.

 

Hate Speech Law for Sri Lanka

Cabinet Spokesman Rajitha Senaratne announced that the government plans to revise the Penal Code to make hate speech a crime a crime punishable by a two -year prison term. The LLRC (Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission) had asserted that hate speech had exacerbated ethnic and religious tensions in Sri Lanka.

Rwanda Example

Kigali, capital of Rwanda is the safest city in Africa today. Twenty years after the genocide in which 800,000 people were slaughtered, Rwanda has transformed into a peaceful and prosperous nation.

In Rwanda in June 1983, a new radio station called RTLMC (Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines) began broadcasting. Drunken presenters found a large receptive audience of resentful thugs. David Yanagizawa-Drott, a Harvard political scientist, estimates that nine percent of the deaths in the genocide, forty-five thousand Tutsis, can be attributed to incitement by Radio RTLM.

Today, journalists criticising the Rwanda government can be prosecuted for defamation. The law prohibits political parties from appealing to group identity, and public statements promoting “divisionism” are forbidden. President Kagame argued that some Westerners define “human rights” too narrowly, defending rights of personal expression while underestimating the importance of stability.

Sri Lankans Hating on Facebook

According to a report by the CPA (Centre for Policy Alternatives), hate speech is a particular problem on the internet and a particular problem in Sri Lanka. The CPA report says that out of a population of 21 million, there are more than 2.3 million users of social media, the majority of them male. Social media provide ”low risk, low cost and high impact online spaces to spread hate, harm and hurt against specific communities, individuals or ideas”.

In Plato’s Republic, there is the tale of a shepherd named Gyges who finds a ring that makes him invisible. He has sex with a queen, kills her king, and takes his throne. The impunity of invisibility is corrupting. Physical invisibility only occurs in fiction but the internet has granted us the license of anonymity and trolls operate under a cloak of invisibility to behave in a way they would not contemplate if they were visible in the real world. They are unaccountable- as Kathryn Schultz puts it:  “like gods and despots, beyond the reach of custom, obligation, and law.”

The CPA report only studies Facebook. One could argue that the CPA’s own website, Groundviews, and its rival Colombo Telegraph, also provide space “to spread hate, harm and hurt against specific communities, individuals or ideas”.

The Offensive Katie Hopkins

Most Sri Lankans will be fortunate in that they have never heard of, or, even luckier, never heard, Katie Hopkins. Masochists among you might wish to look at YouTube to get a flavour. Hopkins first appeared on UK television as a contestant on the reality television programme The Apprentice in 2007. She now writes a column for British “newspaper” the Sun.  She describes herself as a “conduit for truth”. Critics accuse her of expressing controversial opinions to make money.

On 17 April 2015, Hopkins wrote that migrants were “cockroaches”. This appeared in the same week that 400 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean and more than 10,000 were rescued.

An online petition to ban Hopkins from television accumulated over 75,000 signatures. By 21 April, a petition calling on the Sun to sack Hopkins attracted 250,000 signatures.

I note that the CPA report was based solely on research done into Facebook. There has been a lot of noise on Facebook about Hopkins. Julie Burchill is a celebrated polemicist and quite practised at giving offence (and taking it without flinching). Burchill detests Hopkins, her views and unprofessional mode of expressing them. However, she would not want Hopkins to be silenced. “I’m of the opinion that we fought too hard for freedom of speech to have a wrong ‘un like this define the terms of it – one day you’re censoring people who offend you, the next you are being censored by people you offend – it’s a slippery slope”.

No Right not to Be Offended

 

Josie Appleton, a free-speech campaigner, argues that: “Hate speech regulation curtails the moment of ideological conflict, when no crime has been committed. In this, the state appears to be defending the victim. But it is actually defending itself, as the mediator and moderator of public debate, and the judge of what is and is not acceptable.” She describes many frivolous and harmful prosecutions in the UK. We must have the right to offend. No one has the right to be protected from being offended.

 

I am offended when Colombo Telegraph allows someone to call me “a paedophile tourist“.  However, I am inclined to think that the person saying that is just an inadequate boy who feels tough like Gyges hiding behind a pseudonym. I wonder if he would say that to my face. My shoulders are broad and I would not like Uvindu Kurukulusuriya to go to jail for that kind of infantile nonsense.

 

Who Decides?

British journalist Paul Harris offended Anton Balasingham and was punished by being deported from Sri Lanka. Harris gives his own account in his book Delightfully Imperfect published by Vijitha Yapa. Harris wrote in the London Daily Telegraph about flaws in the peace process and called Karuna a “bad egg” and Thamil Chelvan a “rotter”. He called Prabhakaran “Chief Genial Fatty”. It was this irreverent stuff as much as accounts of child conscription and fascist rallies that angered the LTTE. Harris recalls meeting the current prime minister at a Galidari function when Ranil pointedly refused to shake his hand.  The newspaper Nawa Pereliya said that “international arms dealers” were paying Harris’s accommodation bills. That same Rajitha Senaratne who announced the new hate speech law owned Nawa Pereliya. Can we trust people like this to be the mediators and moderators of public debate?

For and Against

 

In his 2007 book, Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: a Biography of the First Amendment, Antony Lewis warns the reader against the potential for governments to suppress freedom of speech in times of fear. Jeremy Waldron, professor of social and political theory at Oxford University, was critical of Lewis’s stance on hate speech. Waldron argues the need for a public climate of mutual respect and tolerance. Waldron believes that it is sometimes necessary to use the law to curtail freedom of speech if speech infringes on the freedom of another.

 

What to Do?

 

Sanjana Hattotuwa writes: “Civility, tolerance and respect for diversity are as hard to find online as they are in Sri Lanka’s mainstream party political framework even post-war.” Incivility, intolerance and venomous hatred are easy to find on Groundviews and Colombo Telegraph.  The comment threads are choked with pseudonymous hate-mongers.  Hattotuwa writes: “It would be a tragedy if the country’s only remaining spaces to ideate, critical (sic) reflect and robustly debate – which are online – are taken over by hate-mongers, to the extent they are allowed to do so in the real world”.

 

Do Groundviews and Colombo Telegraph create the “climate of mutual respect and tolerance” that Waldron desires? Rather than hypocritically neglecting to put its own house in order, CPA could avoid incitement to racial hatred. I recall that, on July 19 2013, during the halal controversy, Groundviews (in an article by no named author)  tried to make something out of a non-issue relating to the brand name on a packet of dates. This could have exacerbated  tensions.

 

Without resorting to law, most publications and websites can use their editorial powers to reduce hatred.  Groundviews tells potential contributors: “Comments containing hate speech, obscenity, and personal attacks will not be approved. Comments that seek to inflame tensions on the ground, or are of a defamatory nature, will not be approved, or will be taken off the website as soon as possible.” It is not self-censorship to enforce your own sensible rules.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Plucky Little Belgium

This article appeared in the October 2014 issue of Echelon magazine.

 

Belgium is a strange concept, more of a vague idea than a real country. There is a joke that there is just one real Belgian, and he is the king, (currently King Philippe, who is married to a speech therapist). Everyone else is either Flemish or Walloon. General de Gaulle described Belgium as a country invented in 1830 by the British to annoy the French. The dominant powers in the 19th Century constructed a neutral state to prevent an invasion of England from Antwerp harbour.

For rich French people, including Gerard Depardieu, the idea of Belgium is as a tax haven. The village of Nechin – which has a street known as Millionaire’s Row – is less than two minutes drive from the French town of Roubaix.

There is a tired old joke about the only famous Belgians being fictional characters like Tin Tin and Hercules Poirot. Let us not forget Plastic Bertrand, born in Brussels of a French father and Ukrainian mother. There are major real Belgian talents such as Georges Simenon, Jacques Brel and painters like James Ensor, Paul Delvaux and René Magritte. Jonathan Meades observed that when you go to Belgium, Rene Magritte stops looking like a surrealist and starts looking like a devastating social realist.

Magritte often painted enigmatic men holding umbrellas. In his recent novel, Christ’s Entry Into Brussels, (the title of one of Ensor’s paintings) Dimitri Verhulst wrote: “the inhabitants of this kingdom value the anonymity provided so perfectly by an umbrella”. In the novel, Jesus Christ announces his return to Earth, and his selected point of entry is Brussels. The citizens of the Belgian capital receive the news with equanimity. There is no reason to get excited.

Centre of the EU Enterprise

One hundred years ago it was thought of as “plucky little Belgium”, a small powerless nation bullied by German military might. The country is about the same size as Maryland, with a population of 10,839,905 people on January 1, 2010. Today, it is the epitome of what EU haters hate about the EU. For Eurosceptics the name of the Belgian capital, “Brussels”, is shorthand for oppressive, anti-democratic, bureaucratic dictatorship.

Belgium was an early adopter in the European project. It was one of the six founder members of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951; in 1957, it was among the founding members of the European Atomic Energy Community and European Economic Community. Today Brussels is the home of the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the extraordinary and committee sessions of the European Parliament.

As well as 20,000 EU civil servants, Brussels attracts a large population of lobbyists, lawyers, and other professionals. The EU has brought an estimated 115,000 extra people to live in Brussels. These people tend to have few or no Belgian friends. There may be some resentment among Bruxellois because of Eurocrats buying up houses with their large tax-exempt EU salaries. People who had lived in Brussels for years suddenly discovered that the best idea to earn is to rent their apartments to the officials and leave the city.

Let’s Talk about the War.

Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg used to be the Low Countries. From the end of the Middle Ages until the 17th century, the area covered by Belgium today was a prosperous commercial centre. It was also a battleground between European powers. The British ‘invented’ Belgium as a neutral state, a buffer zone against the French. Britain intervened to defend Belgian neutrality when German troops invaded in 1914. Before the war, Belgium had one of the world’s most successful economies. The war displaced a third of the population and in the first months of the war, as many as a million Belgians faced starvation because of German requisitions. Around 6,000 Belgians were executed, there were as many as 60,000 military and 23,000 civilian deaths, 25,000 homes and other buildings were destroyed. One and a half million Belgians (20% of the entire population) fled from the invading German army.

Belgium as Oppressor

Belgium is a young country that grew rich suddenly during the industrial revolution, thanks to coal and steel. It also acquired wealth from looting the Congo. Plucky little Belgium was particularly vicious in Africa. Sir Roger Casement, a British diplomat executed by the British for his part in the 1916 Irish Easter Rising, exposed Belgian crimes in the Congo. King Leopold II of Belgium founded the Congo Free State, which covered the entire area of the present day Democratic Republic of the Congo and ran it as a personal fiefdom and business venture. Labourers were not paid but they were beaten, mutilated and murdered.

The province of Katanga seceded after Congolese independence from Belgium in June 1960. Belgium-based mining interests engineered the rebellion so that they could continue mineral extraction. Belgian settlers and former Belgian Army officers provided military support. Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba demanded that Belgian troops withdraw and, when they refused, Lumumba expelled Belgian diplomats. On October 6th, the Belgian Minister for African Affairs sent a cable that stated clearly that Belgian policy was the “definitive elimination” of Lumumba. Lumumba was, indeed, assassinated. A case has been presented that the Belgian government also had a hand in the killing of UN General Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld.

Rwanda was also part of Plucky Little Belgium’s empire. In 1933, the Belgian authorities issued identity cards classifying every Rwandan as Tutsi or Hutu. In 1994, these ID cards helped Hutu to identify hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and kill them. The ethnic cleansing and genocide of twenty years ago were horrendous extensions of the trend that began in the 1950s under the Belgians.

Economy

Belgium was the world’s 15th largest trading nation in 2007. There is still a highly productive work force, high GNP and high exports per capita. Belgium’s main imports are raw materials, machinery and equipment, chemicals, raw diamonds, pharmaceuticals, foodstuffs, transportation equipment, and oil products. Its main exports are machinery and equipment, chemicals, finished diamonds, metals and metal products, and foodstuffs.

Poverty

Belgian Premier Elio di Rupo has questioned the EC’s commitment to austerity and has raised concerns about the best way for Belgium to balance growth and austerity. Political tensions have prevented him doing anything about this in practice. Between 1990 and 2009, the poorest 30 per cent of Belgians saw their share in net taxable incomes fall (from 11.2 to 8.3 per cent), while the richest ten per cent saw their share increase (from 27.3 to 31.9 per cent).

According to the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions survey, 15.3 per cent of Belgium’s population in 2011 was at risk of falling into poverty. In Flemish-speaking Flanders, the wealthiest region in Belgium, this was 9.8 per cent, whereas in Wallonia, a poor French-speaking region, this was 19.2 per cent.

In 2012, nearly one in seven Belgians had a monthly income that was lower than the official poverty threshold (€1,000 for a single person or €2,101 for a couple with two children).Twenty-one per cent of the Belgian population is at risk of poverty or social exclusion, according to the new European poverty indicators.

An Experiment in No Government

During 2007-11, cultural and linguistic tensions resulted in the state being without a government for 589 days. In 2011, Elio Di Rupo became Belgium’s first French-speaking premier; He is of Italian origin and he is gay and socialist. Despite reforms, tensions remain; the formation of a coalition government took 18 months following the June 2010 federal election. However, the hiatus did show that the country could function with just a caretaker government and the civil service.

Federalism

Verhulst sees Belgium a pantomime horse of a country, puzzling to outsiders and infuriating to its inhabitants. Belgium is a federal state divided into three regions: Dutch-speaking Flanders in the north, francophone Wallonia in the south and Brussels, the bilingual capital, where the French and Dutch languages share official status. There is an ongoing political crisis, which may lead to the country splitting, as did Czechoslovakia. It is ironic that the country seen by eurosceptics as the seat of a federalist plot, may itself fall apart. This would provide encouragement to separatist groups throughout Europe. Wallonia is the poorer segment of federal Belgium. How will it survive without the efforts of the industrious Flems? Wallonia will probably need EU subsidies.

Conclusion

A persistent note in visitors’ accounts is that Belgians are discontented and rude. Some might feel guilt at the barbarity of the Belgian colonial project. some feel uncomfortable about the presence in their midst of migrants from that empire.

 

To end on one positive thing about Belgium – it was Belgium that helped soul genius Marvin Gaye to recuperate, if only for a little while. A sojourn in Ostend gave Gaye the breathing space to reach one of his greatest achievements, Sexual Healing.

Plucky little Belgium is in dire need of some kind of healing. One wonders whether this will be possible given Belgium’s central role in the EU project. The EU project itself seems to be increasing the natural disgruntlement of its people.

On 28 July 2010, Plastic Bertrand finally revealed that he was not the singer of any of the songs in the first four albums released beginning in 1977 under the name Plastic Bertrand.

Pros and Cons of R2P

Colman's Column3

Louise Arbour, of the International Crisis Group, said that, “The responsibility to protect is the most important and imaginative doctrine to emerge on the international scene for decades.” Anne-Marie Slaughter from Princeton University has called it “…the most important shift in our conception of sovereignty since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.”

The UN General Assembly endorsed the principle of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) in 2005. The Security Council unanimously reaffirmed the principle in Resolution 1674 in 2006. The head of the UNHRC mission to Darfur, Jodie Williams, used it to evaluate the government of Sudan’s performance, finding that the government had “manifestly failed” in its responsibility to protect its citizens. Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon used R2P in relation to their diplomatic efforts to resolve the post-election conflict in Kenya.

The origins of R2P go back to 1993. The then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed Francis Deng, a well-respected former Sudanese diplomat, as his Special Representative on IDPs (Internally Displaced People). As wars became less a matter of conflict between states and more a struggle between forces within states, so the number of internally displaced increased. Remaining within national borders, IDPs were afforded no special international protection of the kind offered to refugees and so they were vulnerable to the sovereign state.

The following principles emerged:

• A state has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.
• The international community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulfil its primary responsibility.
• If the state manifestly fails to protect its citizens and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions and as a last resort, military intervention.

The immediate reason for R2P was the recognition that the international community had failed to respond to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. Kofi Annan, who was Assistant Secretary-General at the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations at the time of the Rwandan genocide, acknowledged the international community’s failure. When he was Secretary General in 2000, Annan wrote the report We the Peoples. He posed the following questions: “if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?

There had been much debate about the legality of the NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia in 1999. In late 2001, the Canadian government created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

The ICISS argued that six criteria should guide any form of military intervention:

• Just cause – Is the threat a “serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings”?
• Right intention – Is the main intention of the military action to prevent human suffering or are there other motives?
• Final resort – Has every other measure besides military invention been taken into account?
• Legitimate authority.
• Proportional means – Are the minimum necessary military means applied to secure human protection?
• Reasonable prospect – Is it likely that military action will protect human life, and are the consequences of this action sure not to be worse than no action at all?

At the third round table meeting of the ICISS in London, the phrase “responsibility to protect” was chosen as a way to avoid the “right to intervene” or “obligation to intervene” doctrines and yet keep a degree of duty to act to resolve humanitarian crises. The ICISS released its report Responsibility to Protect which advocated that state sovereignty is a responsibility, and that the international community could, as a last resort use military intervention to prevent “mass atrocities”.

The phrase did not immediately stick. At the World Summit in 2005, the member states included R2P in the Outcome Document. The next year, in April 2006, the UN Security Council formalized their support of the R2P by reaffirming the provisions of the paragraphs from the World Summit document. Several governments have argued that they did not, in fact, endorse the principle in 2005 and committed themselves only to further deliberation; and members of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly (Administrative and Budget) resisted the appointment of a special adviser mandated only to develop the ‘concept’ of R2P and build consensus around it.

The committee eventually agreed to the appointment of Edward Luck, but insisted that the phrase R2P be removed from his job title. His surname turned out to be inappropriate. Luck was paid $1 a year for his services. At the UN as an assistant secretary-general, Luck, was primarily involved in conceptualizing, developing and advocating for R2P. From 2007 to 2011, Luck worked at the International Peace Institute, an independent policy research group in New York.

Luck took over as Dean of the Joan B Kroc (she was the third wife of Ray Kroc, who was the CEO of McDonald’s) School of Peace and Studies at the University of San Diego in August 2012. Luck resigned in October 2013 and is suing the University for loss of wages and damage to his reputation, and exemplary damages. His decisions were thwarted by high-level administrators and Provost, Julie Sullivan. She would not let him dismiss a subordinate who was circulating nude pictures. Female staff accused Luck of discriminating against them and being a poor manager. Sorting out Sudan seems simple in comparison to running the Kroc School.

Military interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, East Timor and Bosnia did improve the lives of the people there. Other interventions – for example, in Somalia – did not. There has been international disquiet about R2P and it has been widely suggested that it legitimizes non-consensual intervention, potentially without the sanction of the UN Security Council. Some critics of R2P allege that moral outrage and hysteria conceal the true strategic motives of interventions.

India’s UN Ambassador Singh Puri stated that the Libyan case gave R2P a bad name. “Arms were supplied to civilians without any consideration of its consequences, a no-fly zone was selectively implemented only for flights in and out of Tripoli and targeted measures were implemented insofar as they suited the objective of regime change”. The Russian and Chinese governments both issued statements to the effect that in their opinion R2P had been abused by the US as a pretext for regime change and that experience would make them extremely suspicious of any future Security Council resolutions invoking R2P.

Advocates of R2P claim that the only occasions where the international community will intervene in a state without its consent is when the state has abdicated its responsibilities as a sovereign jurisdiction by allowing mass atrocities to occur, or is committing them. There could be a worrying continuum. Interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, though not primarily humanitarian, eroded public support for military action. Some Syrians who oppose President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, remember Iraq and argue that the one thing worse than a cruel dictator is a sectarian civil war.

In his recent Groundviews piece,
http://groundviews.org/2014/04/10/generating-calamity-2008-2014-an-overview-of-tamil-nationalist-operations-and-their-marvels/
Michael Roberts demonstrates that the LTTE tried to engineer foreign intervention in Sri Lanka because of humanitarian concerns about civilian casualties and IDPs. Could US activity against Sri Lanka at UNHRC morph into R2P and attempted regime change?

Rwanda- Twenty Years after Genocide

This article was published in Ceylon Today on April 16 2016

Colman's Column3

Twenty years have passed since the genocide in Rwanda. The true numbers of dead will never be known – some estimates go as high as five million but the figure generally used is 800,000. In 1994, during 100 days, vast numbers of Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu were killed in well-planned attacks ordered by the interim government that took power when President Habyarimana was assassinated on 6 April.

Divide and Rule
One cannot help but note that in the colonial project it was not uncommon for the imperial power to take advantage of, or even create, ethnic conflicts in pursuit of a divide and rule strategy. Britain did this with Jews and Arabs in Iraq, Tamils and Sinhalese in Ceylon, and in Kenya, Kikuyu and Luo.

Both the Germans and the Belgians promoted Tutsi supremacy in Rwanda, considering the Hutu and Tutsi different races. In 1933, the Belgians made the fateful decision to issue identity cards classifying every Rwandan as Tutsi or Hutu. In 1994, these cards helped Hutu to identify hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and kill them.

One can view the subsequent ethnic cleansing and genocide as horrendous extensions of the trend that began in the 1950s. As the decolonization of Africa was approaching, the Belgians changed their Rwanda policy. They had favoured the Tutsi but they reversed themselves and made the Hutu masters of Rwanda just before granting the country independence in 1962. Hutu activists began killing Tutsi, forcing more than 100,000 to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, including Uganda. In 1962, the now pro-Hutu Belgians held a referendum and elections in which the country voted to abolish the monarchy. Cycles of violence followed, with exiled Tutsi attacking from neighbouring countries and the Hutu retaliating with large-scale slaughter and repression of the Tutsi.

After independence, government-sponsored Hutu gangs carried out periodic massacres of Tutsi. Many Tutsi fled the country. Those who remained became second-class citizens and were denied full rights to education, employment, and travel. Whenever extremist or corrupt Hutu politicians needed a scapegoat, or wished to divert attention away from their own misdeeds, they attacked the Tutsi minority.
In 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana seized power in a military coup. Pro-Hutu discrimination continued, but there was greater economic prosperity and violence against Tutsi diminished.

Aftermath of Genocide
When Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front took over the country, the new government had the daunting logistical problem of dealing with the vast number of people accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The government carried out more than a hundred and twenty-five thousand arrests by 1997. By 2001, Rwanda’s prisons and communal jails were bursting at the seams with 120,000 alleged genocidaires. Rwanda’s courts were shut down for more than two years after the genocide. Amnesty International estimated that after the genocide there were only ten lawyers left in the country. The government calculated that it would take another 110 years to prosecute all the prisoners.

Philip Gourevitch wrote: “Nobody ever talked seriously about conducting tens of thousands of murder trials in Rwanda. Western legal experts liked to say that even the lawyer-crowded United States could not have handled Rwanda’s caseload fairly and expeditiously”.

Gacaca court system
To speed things up, Rwanda implemented the Gacaca court system, often translated as “justice on the grass”. This is a method of transitional justice designed to promote healing and a new start, with justice to some extent being placed in the hands of the victims.

International justice
Gacaca was Rwanda’s own approach to the aftermath of genocide. There was also international intervention. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up in November 1994 by the UN Security Council in order to judge people responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of international law in Rwanda or by Rwandan citizens in nearby states, between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The new Rwandan government came to view the tribunal as an assault on both its legitimacy and sovereignty.

There has been much animosity within Rwanda against the ICTR for its slowness, incompetence and alleged rampant corruption. The UN has a bad name in Rwanda because of its failure to intervene during the genocide.

What is Rwanda Like Today?
Rwanda is a small country with 8.8 million people packed into a land area about the size of Maryland. The population is young and predominantly rural, with a density among the highest in Africa. The climate is moderate, there are few jungles, and slave traders never penetrated into Rwandan territory. Rwanda is landlocked, and for much of its history it was isolated from the world; the first European did not arrive until 1892. It has neither great mineral wealth nor space for large-scale agriculture.

Many observers consider the capital of Rwanda, Kigali, to be the safest city in Africa today, and Rwanda one of the safest countries in the world. An international school opened for the children of foreign investors and entrepreneurs flocking to the country. Rwanda has low corruption compared with neighbouring countries. Many outsiders believe that no other poor country is embarked on such a promising campaign to improve itself, and are thrilled with what President Kagame is doing.

During the 2000s,  Rwanda’s economy, tourist numbers and Human Development Index improved rapidly. Between 2006 and 2011, the poverty rate reduced from 57% to 45%, and child mortality rates dropped from 180 per 1000 live births in 2000 to 111 per 1000 in 2009.

Human Rights
Not everyone sees Paul Kagame as a knight in shining armour. Not everyone buys the story of genocide. Barrie Collins, author of Obedience in Rwanda: A Critical Question, argues that Kagame rose to power because NGOs and the UN convinced the world that what was, in reality, a brutal civil conflict in the early 1990s, was a genocidal act on the part of the Rwandan Hutus, led by then president Juvénal Habyarimana, against Rwandan Tutsis. US Ambassador at Large for War Crime Issues, Stephen Rapp, declared that Rwanda’s leaders could be tried by the International Criminal Court for aiding and abetting war crimes in neighbouring countries such as  the Congo and Central African Republic. Journalists criticising the government can be prosecuted for defamation. Political parties are prohibited from appealing to group identity, and public statements promoting “divisionism” are forbidden. The authorities have used these limitations to imprison critics.

Kagame argued that some Westerners define “human rights” too narrowly, defending rights of personal expression but underestimating the importance of stability and economic progress. Kagame’s defenders argue that too much democracy too soon will split Rwanda apart again. Texan agronomist Tim Schilling said: “It’s necessary to have a little repression here to keep the lid on” while Kagame’s economic development programme takes hold. Many have argued that poverty fed the violence. Kagame is addressing the problem of poverty.

Reconciliation
Whatever the concerns about human rights, there is no denying that Rwanda has transformed from a country devastated by genocide, to a peaceful nation striving for peace and prosperity. An important part of Rwanda’s ongoing recovery process has been the promotion of cultural industries that have clear social benefits. Rwanda’s government worked closely with international partners to establish a platform for promoting the creative industries. Rwanda is focusing on restoring relationships between people through mandatory community service, called umuganda, which means, “coming together in common purpose”. Umuganda contributes greatly to the process of developing a conciliatory accommodation between former antagonists. NAR (Never Again Rwanda) focuses on the role of young people in learning and reflecting on the genocide.

Kubwimana Venuste, Secretary General of the International Foundation for Transformation, wrote, “One needs to remember that there is something in the past to be forgiven. It is probably not possible to attain complete justice or reconciliation, but Rwandans created conditions that favour accountability so that they could move from reconciliation to conciliation.

Instead of moving back to a previous relationship, we built on the possibilities and forged new bonds. Each one of us, Hutu and Tutsi, has the moral duty and responsibility to ensure that never again shall there be the senseless shedding of blood in our country. Remembering can also act as deterrence.”

Reconciliation in Rwanda

Divide and rule

I have said before (and will certainly say again) that the road to hell is paved with false analogies. Nevertheless, one cannot help but note that in the colonial project it was not uncommon for the imperial power to take advantage of, or even create, ethnic conflicts in pursuit of a divide and rule strategy. Britain did this with Jews and Arabs in Iraq, Tamils and Sinhalese in Ceylon, and in Kenya, Kikuyu and Luo.

Rwanda was colonised first by Germany and then by Belgium. The Berlin Conference of 1884 assigned the territory covered by Rwanda and Burundi to Germany as part of German East Africa. The territory was administered as a German colony from 1897 to 1916.

Early explorers had found a monarchical society governed by a class of people who seemed so clever and sophisticated that they did not fit existing European stereotypes of Africans. These were the Tutsi, who made up about 15 percent of the population and ruled a land where the large majority was of another group, the Hutu. Europeans took this as proof of simplistic  racial theories that were then in vogue. Gerard Prunier writes that Europeans were “quite smitten with the Tutsi,” finding them a “superior race” of people who were “meant to reign,” possessed “a refinement of feelings which is rare among primitive people,” and had “an absolutely distinct origin from the negroes.” The Hutu, by contrast, were seen as “less intelligent, more simple, more spontaneous, more trusting…extroverts who like to laugh and lead a simple life.” Ignorant of the complex web of mutual obligation that had bound Tutsi and Hutu together for generations, European colonizers placed one group in direct control of the other.

The Germans did not significantly alter the social structure of the country, but exerted influence by supporting King Kigeli Rwabugiri and the existing hierarchy and delegating power to local chiefs. Tutsi patrons ceded cattle, and therefore privileged status, to Hutu or Tutsi clients in exchange for economic and personal service.

Both the Germans and the Belgians promoted Tutsi supremacy, considering the Hutu and Tutsi different races, a view not universally accepted today. When the Belgians took over they used detailed physical measurements  that they believed would allow them to place every Rwandan in a racial category. In 1933 they made the fateful decision to issue identity cards classifying every Rwandan as Tutsi or Hutu. While it had previously been possible for particularly wealthy Hutu to become honorary Tutsi, the identity cards prevented any further movement between the classes (or races). Scholars disagree on the origins of and differences between the Hutu and Tutsi; some believe that they are derived from former social castes, while others view them as being races or tribe. In 1994 these ID cards helped Hutu to identify hundreds of thousands of Tutsi and kill them.

In the 1950s, as the decolonization of Africa was approaching, the Belgians changed their Rwanda policy. Moved in part by new egalitarian impulses that made them see Tutsi domination as undemocratic, and also by fears that educated Tutsi were turning toward Marxism, they encouraged a rising sense of Hutu grievance. Finally they decided, in the words of John Bale, author of Imagined Olympians, “to switch their support to the educated Hutu.” After ruling for generations through the Tutsi, they reversed themselves and made the Hutu masters of Rwanda just before granting the country independence in 1962.

Hutu militancy increased, as did opposition to the monarchy. The existing system of Tutsi supremacy  was challenged. It was now Hutu who increasingly felt they could re-write history.  They represented Tutsi as Aryan “immigrants” or “invaders.”  The power base had shifted to the Hutu elite. This was a turning point in the political history of Rwanda.  One can thus view the subsequent ethnic cleansing and genocide as horrendous extensions of the trend that began in the 1950s.

Belgium continued to rule Rwanda as a UN Trust Territory after World War II with a mandate to lead the nation to independence. Tension escalated between the Tutsi, who favoured early independence, and the Hutu emancipation movement, culminating in the 1959 Revolution. Hutu activists began killing Tutsi, forcing more than 100,000 to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, including Uganda. In 1962, the now pro-Hutu Belgians held a referendum and elections in which the country voted to abolish the monarchy. Rwanda was separated from Burundi and became  independent in 1962. Cycles of violence followed, with exiled Tutsi attacking from neighbouring countries and the Hutu retaliating with large-scale slaughter and repression of the Tutsi.

After independence, government-sponsored Hutu gangs carried out periodic massacres of Tutsi. Many Tutsi fled the country. Those who remained were given a subservient status much like that imposed on blacks in South Africa. They became second-class citizens and were denied full rights to education, employment, and travel. Whenever extremist or corrupt Hutu politicians needed a scapegoat, or wished to divert attention away from their misdeeds, they attacked the Tutsi minority.

In 1973,  Juvenal Habyarimana seized power in a military coup. Pro-Hutu discrimination continued, but there was greater economic prosperity and violence against Tutsi diminished.

Genocide

In 1994, during  100 days, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsi and politically moderate Hutu were killed in well-planned attacks ordered by  the interim government which took power when  President Habyarimana was assassinated on 6 April. In January 2012, the key findings of a four-year-long expert investigation, commissioned by French judges Marc Trévidic and Nathalie Poux, were released to the world’s media. Most commentators thought the findings vindicated  the ‘official version’ of the Rwandan genocide, which holds that the plane shooting was the opening move by Hutu extremists in their carefully planned genocide of the  Tutsi population. Barry Collins, a writer on African affairs and author of Obedience in Rwanda: A Critical Question,   disagrees. [i] The Tutsi RPF gained  control of the whole country by mid-July. When the RPF took over, two million Hutu fled Rwanda,  in particular to Zaire (now Congo) fearing reprisals.

This definitely meets the criteria of genocide. Victims were chosen because they were Tutsis or Hutus sympathetic to Tutsis. The true numbers of dead will never be known  – some estimates go as high as five million but the figure generally used is 800,000.

The killing of Tutsis by Hutu tends to eclipse the massacres and reprisals carried out against Hutus by the RPA in Rwanda and in IDP camps in the Congo.

How has Rwanda dealt with the aftermath of genocide?

The new government had the  huge logistical problem of dealing with the vast number of  people accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The government carried out more than a hundred and twenty-five thousand arrests by 1997. By 2001, Rwanda’s prisons and communal jails were bursting at the seams with 120,000 alleged genocidaires. Rwanda’s courts were shut down for more than two  years after the genocide.  Amnesty International estimated that after the genocide there were only ten lawyers left in the country.  The government calculated that it would take another 110 years to prosecute all the prisoners.

Philip Gourevitch wrote: “Nobody ever talked seriously about conducting tens of thousands of murder trials in Rwanda. Western legal experts liked to say that even the lawyer-crowded United States could not have handled Rwanda’s caseload fairly and expeditiously”.

From time to time, the government conducted mass releases. After  2003, between fifty and sixty thousand inmates were set free and  on February 19, 2007 eight thousand prisoners were released. Those  released are seldom welcomed back into their communities.

A good start was not made to the process of reconciliation. Punishment and retribution  was the reason, in 1998, for the public execution of 22 prisoners, some of them high ranking officials. The executions drew huge crowds overtaken with blood lust. This was not a way to end the cycle of revenge.

Gacaca court system

To speed things up, Rwanda implemented the Gacaca court system,  often translated as “justice on the grass”. This is a method of transitional justice designed to promote healing and a new start, with justice to some extent being placed in the hands of the victims. Cases have usually  involved cows or land or water and could be remedied by reparations or a heartfelt apology.

The man who inspired Hotel Rwanda, Paul Rusesabagina, wrote:

“The two aggrieved men were required to share a gourd of banana beer as a sign of renewed friendship …. Whether you were the victim or the aggressor you had to strip yourself of pride and recognize the basic humanity of the fellow with whom you were now sharing a banana beer …. Everyone who showed up to hear the case was invited to sip the banana beer too, as a symbol of the accused man’s reconciliation with the entire people.”[ii]

Genocide survivors and the bereaved face the accused and acknowledgement and apologies are encouraged. Confessions are only accepted if they give all information about the crime, including incrimination of co-conspirators.

The system has been criticised because of  survivors being targeted for giving evidence. There have been false accusations as well as intimidation of witnesses. The acquittal rate has been 20%, suggesting a sizable number of cases have not been well-founded. There is a strong chance that witnesses’ memories will be unreliable. Also, there is less protection for defendants than in conventional courts because there are no lawyers – suspects will have to represent themselves. Back in 2005,  Alison des Forges of Human Rights Watch wrote: “Obviously the problem of delivering justice after the genocide is an overwhelming problem. Gacaca may not be ideal but there is at this point no alternative.” Lists of suspects compiled in preparation for Gacaca, indicated that almost as many took part in perpetrating the genocide as were killed.

The courts are based on a traditional way of resolving disputes, in which villagers elect “people of integrity” to hear the evidence and reach a verdict. There are nine judges for each court, and they have the power to impose penalties of up to life in prison. They will deal with major crimes including murder and assault, though rape will still be dealt with by conventional courts.

Jeanette Ayinkamiye, a 23-year-old seamstress, lost her mother, her father and seven brothers during the Rwandan genocide. When interviewed by French journalist Jean Hatzfeld she said: “We forget the details, confuse the dates, mix up the attacks, make mistakes… Over time we still have very precise lists of memories; they become more and more truthful, but we hardly know anymore how to order them in the right way.” According to psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, the accounts of ‘truth’ given by victims and survivors are not about facts. They are about the impact of facts and “the continuing trauma on their lives created by past violence”.

Stephen Kinzer wrote in the New York Review of Books in 2007: “Political and religious leaders are urging people to forgive those who attacked them. An amazing number say they have”. “In a remote and dusty village in Mbyo district, near the border with Burundi, I met a man and woman who were longtime neighbors. In 1994 the man, Xavier Nemeye, hacked to death the husband and four children of the woman, Rosaria Bankundiye. He tried to kill her as well, but she escaped with machete wounds in her skull. She told me that an itinerant Protestant pastor convinced her to forgive Nemeye.  “Through God, we had the blessing of being able to reconcile with those who committed these acts,” she said, speaking slowly and with evident pain. “I don’t wish anything bad for him. If someone kills him, it will not be me.”  There was a long silence after she finished. Then her assailant began his account. “Considering what I did, if I had to sentence myself, even killing me would not be enough,” he said. “This was collective crime. I am guilty, and the government was guilty. The government planned the killing. I killed.”

International justice

Gacaca was Rwanda’s own approach to the aftermath of genocide. There was also international intervention. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was set up in November 1994 by the UN Security Council in order to judge people responsible for the genocide and other serious violations of international law in Rwanda or by Rwandan citizens in nearby states, between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The new Rwandan government came to view the tribunal as an assault on both its legitimacy and sovereignty

From 1995,  ICTR has been sitting at Arusha in Tanzania. Through several resolutions, the Security Council called on the tribunal to complete its investigations by end of 2004, complete all trial activities by end of 2008, and complete all work in 2012. These targets were found to be unrealistic and the Security Council called upon the tribunal to finish its work by 31 December 2014 to prepare for its closure and transfer of its responsibilities to the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals which will begin functioning on 1 July 2012. To judge from the ICTR website, like all areas of  modern life, genocide provides lucrative employment for western ‘consultants’.  http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1264. Each of the ICTR’s  few convictions has cost more than $60 million.

There has been much animosity within Rwanda against the ICTR for its slowness, incompetence and alleged rampant corruption. The UN has a bad name in Rwanda because of its failure to intervene during the genocide.

The retributive nature of the ICTR discourages honesty from the accused in the dock. Georges Rutaganda argued that “It is not Hutus who are guilty of this so-called genocide. We are convinced there was no genocide. It was a situation of mass killings in a state of war where everyone was killing their enemies …. There are a million people dead, but who are they? They are 800,000 Hutus and 200,000 Tutsis. Everyone was killing but the real victims are the Hutus. So they’ve got this so-called genocide all wrong”.

Kohen, Zanchelli and Drake[iii]  argue that restorative justice initiatives have moved Rwanda  closer toward reconciliation than retributive measures, such as those taken by the ICTR. However, they also suggest that the Rwandan government has not shown a serious commitment to healing the wounds that persist between either individual Rwandans or groups. They argue a  case for the importance of pairing a comprehensive search for justice with a commitment to truth-telling and accountability by the victims and perpetrators of the genocide, as well as by current government officials.

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch says: “Accurate accounts of the genocide must establish in all their complexity the roles of the leaders, the followers, and the dissidents within Rwanda as well as the parts played by various international actors. This is essential both for assessing fairly the behavior of individuals and for creating strategies for the future. We must find ways to increase the numbers and effectiveness of resisters against such crimes, whether within or outside the society at risk. We must understand how local and international protest can resonate back and forth to create the swell of outrage that will prevent or halt future genocides.

This work is one of the many that must come to establish the historical record, to lay the groundwork for justice for Rwandans and accountability for all others who failed to respond to the bonds of our common humanity. The story must be told.”

What is Rwanda like today?

Rwanda is a small country with 8.8 million people packed into a land about the size of Maryland. The population is young and predominantly rural, with a density among the highest in Africa. The climate is moderate, there are  few jungles, and slave traders never penetrated into Rwandan territory. Rwanda is landlocked, and for much of its history it was isolated from the world; the first European did not arrive until 1892. It has neither great mineral wealth nor space for large-scale agriculture.

The capital of Rwanda, Kigali,  is considered by many observers to be the safest city in Africa today, and Rwanda one of the safest countries in the world. An international school opened for the  children of  foreign investors and entrepreneurs flocking to the country. Rwanda has low corruption compared with neighbouring countries. Many outsiders believe that no other poor country is embarked on such a promising campaign to improve itself, and are thrilled with what President Kagame is doing.

“How can I forgive, when my livelihood was destroyed and I cannot even pay for the schooling of my children?”[vi] Many have argued that poverty fed the violence. Kagame is addressing the problem of poverty.

During the 2000s Rwanda’s economy, tourist numbers and Human Development Index improved rapidly. Between 2006 and 2011 the poverty rate reduced from 57% to 45%, and child mortality rates dropped from 180 per 1000 live births in 2000 to 111 per 1000 in 2009.

In 2007, Stephen Kinzer reviewed  several books on Rwanda and discussed his own experience of the country in the New York Review of Books. Kinzer quoted Josh Ruxin, the former director of a health programme at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, who was  so enthusiastic about Rwanda’s prospects that he moved there to run  a “Millennium Village” project in a rural part of the country. “I’ve worked in fifty countries and I think this is the only country on the planet that stands a chance of migrating from extreme poverty to middle income in the space of the next fifteen years.”

Human rights

Despite the apparent success in recovering from the genocide, the Rwandan government has been criticized by human rights groups. Before the 2003 presidential election, the man who would have been Kagame’s principal opponent was jailed on corruption charges. Political parties are prohibited from appealing to group identity, and public statements promoting “divisionism” are forbidden. The authorities have used these limitations to imprison critics.

Philip Gourevitch has written extensively about Rwanda (and Sri Lanka) in the New Yorker and elsewhere.[iv] He defended himself in the Columbia Journalism Review against charges that he was pro-Kagame. The were some interesting comments on the article from bloggers. An anonymous commenter  wrote: “Gourevitch has never been a shill or sycophant. Gourevitch is right to press his criticisms of the international aid community and the botched humanitarian efforts that have enabled killers as much as rescued victims and survivors. What is even more surprising is how France remains marginal to the  story even though they, more than any outsider, were the chief enabler of the Hutus and who continue to bungle its involvement and the events on the ground”.

The editor of an independent Rwandan newspaper, Shyaka Kanuma, said  that for years he saw Kagame as “a power-hungry, self-serving guy.” However he acknowledges that: “Some of the things he did to suppress opposition were necessary. We have people in our country who would do absolutely anything to get power.”

“Media have had a destructive role in the history of Rwanda. The use of the media by powers especially in the preparation and execution of genocide has had harmful effects on their credibility in our society. We still have in mind the notorious Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, as well as Kangura newspaper. How can we make of media instruments of peace and not hatred?”[v]

Human Rights Watch has pointed out the deficiencies of the Gacaca system. “Many individuals accused of very serious crimes—such as multiple murders—can now be tried by Gacaca in seeming contradiction to its original purpose.”  HRW concedes that the present iteration seeks to establish offender accountability while also serving the government’s goal of catalyzing the slow-moving genocide trials.” The government had to do something about the huge prison population. Human rights campaigners were complaining about cruel and inhuman treatment. Releasing prisoners and using the Gacaca system means that a lot of guilty and dangerous people are on the loose. It is unsurprising that the government does what it can to impose a firm hand and regards western ides of human rights as a luxury in this situation.

Kagame argued that some Westerners define “human rights” too narrowly, defending rights of personal expression but underestimating the importance of stability and economic progress. Kagame’s defenders argue that too much democracy too soon will split Rwanda apart again. Texan agronomist Tim Schilling told Kinzer: “It’s necessary to have a little repression here to keep the lid on” while Kagame’s economic development program takes hold.

Foreign intervention

Another Rwandan  reader of Gourevitch’s CJR article commented: “What Rwandans need to ask themselves, what Africans need to ask themselves, is for how much longer will we base our apparent differences on things written from a western perspective? How much longer will we hate each other because of things written by the west? Because it is only them who write historical facts about how different we are!”

Another commenter, Mikhaila Cupido wrote: “Currently the good guy seems to be Hutu. And no one takes into consideration how hard the country is working on getting rid of these colonial references to the Rwandan people. And these rantings remind me of the colonialists  and their once great love of the Tutsi and when they couldn’t benefit from it anymore they swapped sides to the Hutu.”

Remembering

Rwanda is covered with memorials to the genocide. Some killing sites were left intact with the bones of victims on display. Because the country is densely populated, Rwandan citizens see these memorials every day. There is a national day of mourning every year in April and the president leads a ceremony which is broadcast nationally.

In spite of this enforced “remembering” there are also “silences”. No history is taught in schools because there is no consensus on what to put in the national curriculum.[vii] There has been a pragmatic failure to investigate crimes committed by the RPA. This has given fuel to Hutu ideologues attempting to raise ethnic consciousness.

Kohen et al: [viii]“The lack of honest, public discussion about ethnicity in Rwanda poses serious problems for the process of political reconciliation. If these ethnic terms are wholly suppressed, it seemingly becomes impossible for the victimized group to forgive the offending group. For if the government was to undertake the difficult work of identifying prominent victims who might offer forgiveness to the Hutus as a group—or if Kagame, himself a refugee of Hutu-led violence, were to act as Rwanda’s Mandela—these statements would be in direct contradiction of policies of ethnic re-education. Further, the loose interpretation of terms like ‘genocidal Ideology’ and ‘divisionism’ discourage any sort of public dialogue on the role that ethnic identity can or should play in Rwandan society. This discourse could potentially be very useful in setting the stage for political reconciliation, as it could establish a common understanding between Hutus and Tutsis collectively. Taken together, these policies not only move Rwanda further from a comprehensive attempt at political reconciliation, but make it virtually impossible for Hutus and Tutsis to begin rebuilding the trust that was so violently broken by the genocide.”

The world might see the Hutus as monsters in the genocide but they can still see themselves as victims. Kohen et al:“The continued emphasis on Hutu victimization encourages offenders to view their participation in the genocide as legitimate action in the face of their own potential victimization while clearly discouraging an apology to those Tutsi whose families were murdered or who were themselves in grave danger. This feeling of  victimization is furthered by the perception amongst Hutu that members of the RPF are not held accountable for crimes they committed, as neither the ICTR nor the gacaca courts have jurisdiction to try these crimes.”

Govier[ix] points out, “A group’s acknowledgment of its own victimization poses dangers of a cult-like and ceremonial sharing of group pain. In the ‘we-ness’ cultivated under the ethnic tent, a sense of victimhood may be created all too easily, and may too readily displace efforts to understand the complexities of the past.”  Jeremy Sarkin[x]  suggests what is needed is  “a properly constituted, totally independent, non-government appointed commission in Rwanda,” without which “anger, resentment, hatred, and revenge might be the order of the day.”


[ii] Rusesabagina’s  autobiography entitled An Ordinary Man was the basis of the film Hotel Rwanda. Rusesabagina has called Kagame a war criminal and alleges “Rwanda is today a nation governed by and for the benefit of a small group of elite Tutsis…Those few Hutus who have been elevated to high-ranking posts are usually empty suits without any real authority of their own. They are known locally as Hutus de service or Hutus for hire.” He has also criticized Kagame’s election to president.

[iii] Personal and Political Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Social Justice Research March 15, 2011

[iv] We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families, Gourevitch (1998)

[v] Institute for Dialogue and Peace http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/3654.pdf

[vi] Ervin Staub , Healing, reconciliation, forgiving and the prevention of violence after genocide or mass killing: an intervention and its experimental evaluation in Rwanda Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2005, pp. 297-334

[vii] Eugenia Zorbas Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Journal of African Legal studies.

[viii] Personal and Political Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Ari Kohen, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Michael Zanchelli, Washington, D.C. ,Levi Drake Washington, D.C.

[ix] Govier, T. (2002). Forgiveness and revenge. London: Routledge.

[x] The Tension between Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Politics, Human Rights, Due Process and the Role of the Gacaca Courts in Dealing with the Genocide, Jeremy Sarkin, Journal of African Law, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2001)

Jeremy Sarkin, Journal of African Law, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2001)

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