Reconciliation in Bosnia

by padraigcolman

Yugonostalgia

 


I am old enough to recall when Yugoslavia was held up by leftists in the west as a model for how a society and economy could  be run for the benefit of citizens rather than corporations. Yugoslavia experimented  with a type of independent socialism that allowed  workers in state-run enterprises to participate in management. I purchased  a volume Penguin published of  learned essays on worker self-management (sometimes called workers’ control or autogestion) in which socialist intellectuals enthused about Yugoslavia. Autogestion, they believed, was the answer to labour relation problems in the west.

Tito could be seen as a benevolent dictator because he had stood up to Stalin. “Stop sending people to kill me. We’ve already captured five of them, one of them with a bomb and another with a rifle (…) If you don’t stop sending killers, I’ll send one to Moscow, and I won’t have to send a second.” His internal policies successfully maintained the peaceful coexistence of the nations of the Yugoslav federation and  he gained international attention as the chief leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. On 1 January 1967, Yugoslavia was the first communist country to open its borders to all foreign visitors and abolish visa requirements. Croatia became a popular holiday destination and its wine appeared on British supermarket shelves.
Tito’s good reputation survived  the criticisms of dissident Milovan Djilas, who had been regarded as Tito’s natural successor. Slobodan Markovic, a political scientist, derided a wave of Yugonostalgia: “People have forgotten that Tito was a dictator. They remember there was peace and stability, and they forget the violation of human rights. Yugoslavia lived well because it was the only communist country that received enormous US aid and then loans.”

One hundred and twenty-eight countries sent political delegations to Tito’s funeral; those present included the USSR’s Brezhnev, Jimmy Carter’s mother, James Callaghan, Yasser Arafat, Colonel Gaddafi, the Duke of Edinburgh, Nicolae Ceausescu, Erich Honecker. There were four kings, 31 presidents, six princes, 22 prime ministers, 47 foreign ministers. Only five countries, including Pinochet’s Chile and apartheid-era South Africa, stayed away.

Entropy

After Tito’s death in 1980, the New York Times wrote: ”Tito sought to improve life. … Yugoslavia gradually became a bright spot amid the general greyness of Eastern Europe”.  Tensions between the Yugoslav republics soon emerged and in 1991 the country collapsed into a mayhem of  inter-communal strife and horror. Djilas wrote: “Our system was built only for Tito to manage. Now that Tito is gone and our economic situation becomes critical, there will be a natural tendency for greater centralization of power. But this centralization will not succeed because it will run up against the ethnic-political power bases in the republics. This is not classical nationalism but a more dangerous, bureaucratic nationalism built on economic self-interest. This is how the Yugoslav system will begin to collapse.”

 

 
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was particularly complex and horrific because there were so many parties involved. It was principally a territorial conflict, initially between Serb forces and the national army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was mainly composed of Muslim Bosniaks, and Croatian forces. The population of the  multi-ethnic, multi-faith  Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was 44% Muslim Bosniaks, 31% Orthodox Serbs, 17% Catholic Croats. Serbs set up their own enclave within Bosnia, Republika Srpska, whose army had some 80,000 personnel during the war and  committed war crimes and genocide against Bosnia Muslims and Croats.

Sarajevo and Srebrenica

There is no space here to describe the full complexity and horror of the Bosnian war. Let Sarajevo and Srebrenica stand as specimens. The siege of Sarajevo was the longest siege of a capital city in the history of modern warfare, three times longer than the Siege of Stalingrad. There was an average of 329 shell impacts per day during the course of the siege, with a maximum of 3,777 on 22 July 1993. It is estimated that nearly 12,000 people were killed or went missing in the city, including over 1,500 children. An additional 56,000 people were wounded, including nearly 15,000 children. Snipers killed civilians queuing for water or trying to buy food in the market. Bosniak  homes were ransacked, males taken to concentration camps, women repeatedly raped. UNICEF reported that, at least 40% children in the city had been directly shot at by snipers; 51% had seen someone killed; 39% had seen one or more family members killed; 19% had witnessed a massacre; 48% had their home occupied by someone else; 73% had their home attacked or shelled; and 89% had lived in underground shelters. The Bosnian Government reported a soaring suicide rate by Sarajevans, a near doubling of abortions and a 50% drop in births since the siege began.

In July 1995, at Srebrenica, a  “safe area” under UN protection, 8,000 Muslim men and boys were rounded up by Serb forces under Ratko Mladić  and massacred.

The genocidal plan was orchestrated by poet-politician Radovan Karadžić, President of Republika Srpska.

Karadžić was accused of directing Bosnian Serb forces to “create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival of life” in the UN safe area. In addition, he is accused by the ICTY of ordering that UN  personnel be taken hostage in May–June 1995.The Bosniak victims included boys aged under 15, men over the age of 65, women, and reportedly even several babies.


UN failings – to intervene or not to intervene?

Dutch UN soldiers were criticised for failing to protect the Bosniak refugees in the “safe area”. Lieutenant-Colonel Thom Karremans was filmed drinking a toast with  Mladić . Zumra Šehomerovic reported mass rapes. The rapes often took place under the eyes of others and sometimes even under the eyes of the children of the mother. A Dutch soldier stood by and he simply looked around with a  Walkman on his head. He did not react at all to what was happening. It did not happen just before my eyes, for I saw that personally, but also before the eyes of us all. The Dutch soldiers walked around everywhere. It is impossible that they did not see it.”

 
In 2005, in a message on  the tenth anniversary commemoration of the genocide, Kofi Annan  noted that, while blame lay first and foremost with those who planned and carried out the massacre and those who assisted and harboured them, great nations had failed to respond adequately.  Srebrenica would haunt the UN forever.  In 2004, the International Criminal court ruled that the massacre constituted genocide, a crime under international law.

Jasmin Mujanović argues that persistent fallacies have informed the international community’s attempts to “deal” with Bosnia since (at least) 1991-92. He writes that the war was not “the result of the unbridled and millennial ethnic hatreds of its peoples, but rather the engineered and orchestrated machinations of an unaccountable political elite seeking to secure its political and economic survival in a period of immense social crisis”… Significant elements of the international community advocated a foreign policy based on preserving a vacuous conception of ‘stability’ and ‘unity’ rather than a principled insistence on democratization and human rights. …the international community had sent strong signals to the country’s leadership that an increased role by the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) would be a welcome step towards checking some of their growing concerns about the stability of political authority in the country in the post-Tito period.”

Death Toll

There are large discrepancies between estimates of the total number of casualties in the Bosnian war, ranging from 25,000 to 329,000. According to Prof. Steven L. Burg and Prof. Paul S. Shoup: “The figure of 200,000 (or more) dead, injured, and missing was frequently cited in media reports on the war in Bosnia as late as 1994. The October 1995 bulletin of the Bosnian Institute for Public Health of the Republic Committee for Health and Social Welfare gave the numbers as 146,340 killed, and 174,914 wounded on the territory under the control of the Bosnian army. Mustafa Imamovic gave a figure of 144,248 perished (including those who died from hunger or exposure), mainly Muslims. The Red Cross and the UNHCR have not, to the best of our knowledge, produced data on the number of persons killed and injured in the course of the war. A November 1995 unclassified CIA memorandum estimated 156,500 civilian deaths in the country (all but 10,000 of them in Muslim- or Croat-held territories), not including the 8,000 to 10,000 then still missing from Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves. This figure for civilian deaths far exceeded the estimate in the same report of 81,500 troops killed (45,000 Bosnian government; 6,500 Bosnian Croat; and 30,000 Bosnian Serb).”

Peace?

There were several major massacres during 1995 and NATO made many airstrikes against Bosnian Serb positions supported by UNPROFOR rapid reaction force artillery attacks. On 14 September 1995, the NATO air strikes were suspended to allow the implementation of an agreement with Bosnian Serbs for the withdrawal of heavy weapons from around Sarajevo. On 26 September 1995, an agreement of further basic principles for a peace accord was reached in New York. A 60-day ceasefire came into effect on 12 October, and on 1 November peace talks began in Dayton, Ohio. The war ended with the Dayton Peace Agreement signed on 21 November 1995.

The Dayton Accord was described as a “construction of necessity” the immediate purpose of which  was to freeze the military confrontation, and prevent it  from resuming. There is no space here to go into the intricate juggling to swap territories from one group to another in order to establish the new nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). Many scholars have deemed Dayton an  impressive example of conflict resolution which has turned Bosnia from a basket-case to a potential EU member.

Critics have, however, had problems with the fact  international , unaccountable to BiH’s citizens, to shape the agenda of post-war transition, and decide  punishment for  local political actors. Another perceived flaw is  each ethnic group was discontented with the results. Bosniaks were upset that  human rights issues were ignored  and that Serbian entities were given recognition. Edin Šarčević, of the Bosnian Academy of Sciences and Arts, the current legal structure of the agreement does not abide by the basic principles of international law making the Bosnian territorial and political situation continually unstable and fractious since its implementation.

Truth and Reconciliation

Retributive justice is impossible to apply in a context like Bosnia where so many were involved in the conflict. There are not enough resources to capture and try everyone who committed war crimes. Widespread arrests would reignite conflict. In January 2005, Hajra Catic, of the Mothers of Srebrenica organization, “lost faith” in ICTY’s ability to dispense justice after they sentenced Dragan Jokic, a man she believed was responsible for 3,000 deaths, to only nine years in prison.

Eileen Babbitt wrote about  UN efforts to reintegrate refugees: “they were coming back to communities where they were really, really unwanted. Most of them were coming back to places where they were a majority population and now post-war they are the minority, so another group has literally taken over and moved into their homes, and many of those people are also displaced, traumatized, etc. and they’re not about to simply give up everything and welcome the returning refugees with open arms.”

Reconciliation is hampered by a refusal to face up to the truth because each group has its own narrative. Schools are  strictly segregated and  children learn three different versions of the  war. After many failed attempts, there has still not been a successful truth commission.

On 6 December 2004, Serbian president Boris Tadić made an apology to all those who suffered crimes committed in the name of the Serb people. Croatia’s president Ivo Josipović apologized in April 2010 for his country’s role in the Bosnian War. On 31 March 2010, the Serbian parliament adopted a declaration “condemning in strongest terms the crime committed in July 1995 against Bosniak population of Srebrenica” and apologizing to the families of the victims.

Europe

In Bosnia, 88% support the country’s bid for EU membership. Identification with Europe as a supranational community can in Bosnia and Herzegovina become a way to overcome ethnic differences. Poll results show that support for EU membership is strongest in the Muslim community, with 97% in favour, while 85%  of Bosnian Croats support it and 78% of Bosnian Serbs. The EU-initiated processes of institutional engineering and systemic inclusion of minority groups and non-nationalists into policy-making processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina signals an important and historic shift from an ethnocentric citizenship model towards a democratic and inclusive citizenship regime.

Bosnia today

On 25 July 2012 Ban Ki-moon addressed the BiH parliament and noted the progress achieved by Bosnia and Herzegovina over the last two decades, including its transformation from a country which hosted UN peacekeepers to a troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, and from occupying the agenda of the Security Council to successfully serving on the Council. “Led by your priorities and direction, we are working together to create jobs especially for young people, extend social protection for the most vulnerable groups, end the suffering of those enduring protracted displacement, safeguard the environment, tackle discrimination and promote respect for human rights and the rule of law.”

The Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) highlighted the continued marginalization of minority groups, particularly Roma. In a joint opinion issued in June, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UK Foreign Affairs Minister William Hague expressed disappointment at the protracted institutional gridlock in Bosnia that was preventing needed reforms, including ending ethnic discrimination in politics.

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